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ABSTRACT. Today, humankind is being reintroduced within nature. Humankind is 
no longer presented as supernatural to nature. There is no longer a clear divide 
between animal and human. What makes us human is neither culture, nor language 
nor labor, nor art, but the degree of complexity those products and capabilities have 
reached for us as a species. Neither are love, learning, power, fantasy, communication, 
affection, hierarchy, strategy, altruism, community, social relations, social norms or 
social status the defining characteristics of humanness. All of these are to be experi- 
enced by other animal species. Today, what is regarded as the essential characteristic 
of humankind is the ability to use a complex articulated language, to have thoughts 
entailing abstraction and conceptualization. It is the ability to operate with deferred 
representations, the necessity to relate to inner worlds of representation, and the 
craving to make sense of all kinds of relations that characterizes humans. Being able 
to produce artworks as external representations aimed at “the other,” made of internal 
representations is thus essential to humanity. Human aesthetics is not so much an 
issue of beauty but of imagination and social creativity. Art is fundamentally about 
shaping visions and very closely related to this specific human ability to make 
projects. Especially in times of crisis, when the old sources of meaning hardly can 
make sense in a new context, imagination must be used in order to survive.  
 
Keywords: aesthetic; art; creativity; culture; imaginary; language; technique 
 
“From the birth of our species ... the human species in the strict sense  
of the word made works of art. Art is its distinguishing characteristic,  
along the same line as its aspect, which is both upright and slender.”1  
Georges Bataille 
 
1. Beyond Utility and Technique 
 
From an historical and anthropological point of view, art is an expression of 
humankind relating to its surroundings including itself. Even at the individual 
level one has to distinguish art from craft and technique,2 one of the main 
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reasons being that we need a concept to distinguish between creative works 
that really make a difference and those that merely please. Artworks can neither 
be replaced nor created twice. They are different, for example, from scientific 
discoveries that can be postponed. Another scientist or another community 
of scientists is most likely to push knowledge further even though a great 
scientist may die just before revealing his or her impending new discovery. 
Similar to the situation in science, some individual craftsman or community 
of craftsmen is most likely to develop a new technique or a better design. 
True artworks, on the other hand, are epochal in a fundamental way: they 
change our relation to the world including ourselves. And those – individuals 
or groups – who created such artworks are irreplaceable: it had to be them, 
specifically, in the time and context they were in. Adding to this, the implicit 
choices and outbursts of creativity cannot be understood from within their 
own frame of reference but have to be placed in a logic of continuity and 
difference. 
If by language we refer to a system of signs used by the members of a 
same species to communicate among themselves, we know now for certain 
that humans are not the only animals to produce tools, are not the only 
animals to use a language, are not the only animals to have a culture, and are 
not the only animals to create beautiful designs.3 Such evidence is in contrast 
with a long prevailing prejudice. This self erected pedestal on which we had 
proudly put ourselves in self-contemplation now shows serious cracks and is 
pretty unstable. We seem to have lost the exclusivity of all the properties 
which made us nearer and dearer to our gods.4 We seem to have lost our 
means; though, essentially, we still have them. But we now know that the 
demarcation line between humankind and other animals is not of kind but of 
degree and goes through all of these abilities (Bourg, 2013). What differentiates 
human beings is only a matter of degree of complexity in the elaboration and 
usage of all distinguishing capabilities.5 
 
2. The Specificity of Human Language 
 
Humankind still stands out (if not necessarily “up”). Not only is every single 
one of those capabilities used by humans in an outstanding manner, these means 
combine with one another in outstanding ways. Thus, the kind of language 
used by humans is much more complex than the systems of communication 
that are used by other species: there is not only a distinction of degree but also 
of complexity. The symbolic language that humans use to pass, address and 
discuss meanings and significations is much more complex than precisely 
languages that cannot be used to assign and combine significations. Observa- 
tions of animal messages and theoretical progress made in general linguistics 
during the last century revealed the importance of the two-fold structuring of 
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human language (Ricœur, 1990: 438). This double articulation refers to the 
possibility of combining a phonological level and a syntactic level in order 
to express meaning. There is a duality of structure. A message is structured 
into meaningful units consisting of a signifier and a signified. The minimal 
non-reducible signifying units called monemes (or morphemes in the American 
linguistic terminology) can be combined in various ways to convey different 
messages. They are themselves made of a combination of meaningless 
sounds called phonemes. Thus the double articulation is not only about 
lexicon and syntax, about words and sentences: words themselves are made 
of non-signifying but distinctive units (the phonemes). It is this outstanding 
possibility to combine those different kinds of units in order to communicate 
that is considered to be the major characteristic of human language (Langaney, 
2000: 23). 
The fact that some apes can learn some words from humans and use them 
to communicate with humans should not be interpreted as if there was no 
difference in language use between humans and apes. As the Canadian 
psycho-linguist Steven Pinker said: “Language is obviously as different from 
other animals’ communication systems as the elephant’s trunk is different 
from other animals’ nostrils” (Pinker, 1994: 334). Pinker points out that the 
discrete combinatorial system called “grammar” makes human language 
infinite, digital and compositional.6 
The French psychologist Jacques Vauclair as well as the neurobiologist 
Jean-Didier Vincent point out that human words have a declarative function 
which enables humans to comment upon their world and to share experien- 
ces, knowledge and impressions. Only the imperative mode is available for 
chimpanzees to communicate with.7 They can point out things to ask for food 
or to go out for instance, but they cannot reflect upon what that “pointing 
out” in a broader context could mean. Moreover, they do not seem to be able 
to endow others with intentions (Vauclair, 1999: 155). Besides, no natural 
language, even in an embryonic state, has ever been encountered in any kind 
of ape but humans (Vincent, 2000: 174). In every experiment, it is always 
humans that teach apes. As the French ethologist Dominique Lestel points 
out, research concerning great apes’ linguistic ability always occur in the 
context of a communication between humans and apes in which humans are 
those who inquire (Lestel, 1998: 1006). 
On the other hand, the ability to speak lies in the human brain just like the 
ability to sing or fly lies in the bird’s brain (Vincent, 2000: 169). “People 
know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin 
webs” (Pinker, 1994: 18). Still, even though there are anatomic dispositions 
and neural organizations enabling the human young child to learn how to 
speak during a critical period of time, the infant has to learn how to speak 
through human contact (Vincent, 2000: 171).8 The researchers who studied 
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the acquisition of language by humans and by the bonobos emphasize a 
radical difference between how small children learn and how bonobos do. 
For a start, a three-year-old human child is a grammatical genius. His or her 
tacit knowledge of grammar is “more sophisticated than the thickest style 
manual or the most state-of-the-art computer language system” (Pinker, 
1994: 19). Adding to this, David Premack stresses that never ever did he 
experience a bonobo wanting to share the experience of its discovery just for 
the sake of sharing it. Conversely, even before being able to talk, a child will 
go and fetch its mother to bring her to the window to point out something 
new it just discovered, “not because it wants the thing, just to share with her 
the excitement of the discovery” (Premack, 1999: 147 author’s translation). 
The French philosopher Luc Ferry sees in such behavior from the part of the 
child an expression of “freedom and gratuitousness” (Ferry and Vincent, 
2000: 101).9 Jean-Didier Vincent stresses that human language allows the 
sharing of “subjectivity,” whereas there is not a trace of socio-affective 
content in any animal language. It is totally absent (Vincent, 2000: 180). The 
child endowed with the inborn ability to learn to communicate linguistically 
uses language to discover the world and share it with others. The behavior of 
the human child clearly demonstrates that he or she wants to know the name 
of things just for the sake of knowing and sharing. 
This of course is based on the faculty also shared with other animals and 
especially with primates, the faculty of having and expressing emotions. Yet, 
in the human mind, these emotions enter another system of representation. 
Thus, they fill the human mind in a much more advanced way10 and act upon 
human relations in a more complex manner. Thanks to conceptual language, 
human emotions contribute to structure and feed conscious reflexive thoughts. 
And above all, the willingness and ability humans’ show to share and express, 
through language, their emotions, their experiences of pleasure and pain, is 
at the root of culture and aesthetics. Even though other animals do create 
patterns similar to human art, they still do so in an imperative mode. Con- 
sider, for instance, those Australian birds that make difficult and beautiful 
designs of blue colours in order to attract their mate. Again, their aim is 
action not signification. Sharing experiences in a declarative significative 
manner, is still the privilege of humankind. “Artworks, the Mona Lisa in the 
Louvre, the Cow in Lascaux, are external representations aimed at the ‘the 
other’, made of internal representations conceived of in the artist’s brain” 
(Vincent, 2000: 194 author’s translation). 
Thus, there is indeed a similarity and continuity between how animals and 
humans manage to represent and communicate. Humans, however, manage 
to communicate more and communicate differently. Human language extends 
and combines cognitive and communicative components into a system that 
increases significantly what can be taken into consideration and communicated 
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in and between human minds. This is why it can be said that humans live in 
a different world. 
 
3. The Specificity of the Human World 
 
Animals have an immediate relation with objects they are driven to. All the 
rest does not matter to them so to speak, and they do not have to think about 
it, just act. As the French philosopher Max Marcuzzi expresses it, for the most 
part, human conduct “implies the undertaking of action on the basis of an 
understanding of the situation” (Marcuzzi, 1996: 170 author’s translation); 
but the specificity of human consciousness is involved and “for a large part, 
human consciousness relies on the effort to reconstruct foreign worlds on the 
basis of signs emitted by those inhabiting those worlds” (Marcuzzi, 1996: 
357 author’s translation). 
The fact that for instance a chimpanzee does learn, from experience, to 
reach for a banana with a stick clearly shows its intelligent behavior. This 
stick is a tool, and understanding was required to produce such a tool, but 
not reason, as many philosophers would point out. Understanding relates to 
means, not necessarily to ends. In this case, ends are set for the chimpanzee 
in advance, by its instincts. In contrast, reason provides humans with the 
ability to set goals. It is possible for a human being to survey the means-end 
relationship. Knowledge and intelligence do not only accompany the act of 
producing the tool then, they generate the act of willing to produce it, and 
this in a broad context in which a whole word of signification is involved. 
This is why many philosophers introduce a specific concept for this: that of 
reason or – we will come back to it – that of imagination. 
Animals are bound to bite into the world in the same way they are cast in 
it. They do not – and cannot – add anything to their enclosed world, their 
environment. They cannot relate to anything that does not already pertain to 
their world. Of course, something new can turn up, but it just happens to be 
placed there. And, whether they will confront this new thing is also a matter 
of whether it can immediately make sense – or rather find a place – in their 
enclosed world, in their environment. The kind of relation animals have with 
their surrounding is always triggered by a drive. Objects do not have to make 
sense other than as drivers. Outside of their enclosed surroundings there is 
nothing animals can relate to. They can neither escape their programming 
nor influence the particular objects beyond the scope of this programming.  
Some can memorize. Some can even dream about objects in their enclosed 
world. Here again, the incorporeality experienced among humans is just a 
more complex development of a potential experienced among other animals. 
The specific human way of acting not only involves something more, as Mar- 
cuzzi says, it “takes form integrating understandable intangibles (incorporeals) 
CEEOL copyright 2017
CEEOL copyright 2017
 21 
when acting” (Marcuzzi, 1996: 162 author’s translation). This, according to 
Marcuzzi, makes the human body different from that of the animal. And this 
is why it is worth having a specific concept to name specific human behaviors. 
The German philosopher Martin Heidegger named it comportment, stress- 
ing the fact that it is possible for humans to let be or not let be, a fact that is 
indeed central to creativity. In his philosophy of being (Sein) and world (Welt), 
Heidegger (1992 (1983): 397§64) presented the thesis that “der Mensch ist 
weltbildend ” – “man is world-forming,” whereas the animal is poor in the 
world. He opposed the animals’ behaviour of captivation (Benehmen) to the 
possibility that humans have to let something be or not. It is this relation to 
something, “which is thoroughly governed by this letting be of something as 
a being” that he called comportment [Verhalten] (Heidegger, 1992 (1983): 
397§64). Here is how he summarizes his understanding of what a world is 
and how it is specific to human beings: 
 
Only where beings (Seiendes) are manifest as beings at all, do we 
find the possibility of experiencing this or that particular being as 
determined in this or that particular way – experiencing (erfahren) 
in the broader sense which goes beyond mere acquaintance with 
something, in the sense of having experiences with it (Heidegger, 
1995 (1983): 274). 
 
According to Heidegger, as far as humans are concerned, nature does not 
just stand there, surrounding humankind with an abundance of objects. Rather 
“human Dasein is intrinsically a peculiar transposedness (Versetztsein) into 
the encompassing contextual ring (Umringzusammenhang) of living beings” 
(Heidegger, 1995 (1983): 278§66).  
Depending on what their brains allows, animals will indeed relate and 
connect images that pertain to their enclosed world. Thus there is an opening, 
but it is still deeply attached to the enclosed world and motivated by drives. 
Still, being able to memorize images and even to unify certain representations 
within a consciousness is by far the creation of a radically new world of con- 
structed and interrelated representations. Apes for instance do not produce an 
ape world. They do not – and cannot – question the world they live in. They 
do not attach meaning to what they perceive. They just express what they 
want, and what they want are things or actions. As for the human child, their 
language develops simultaneously as their human world takes form. Even 
the things and actions they might want are bound to be infected by their 
emerged world of significations and nothing, no object, in itself makes sense. 
In order to make sense, an object has to be related to a context, for instance 
to its production, its destination. Anyway, there is always something more – 
that is not (just) a thing – that overwhelms the object. Everything can enter 
various systems of significations. Every object has several meanings depend- 
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ing on actual and virtual contexts, and on who is looking at it. Every object 
is meaningful within a virtuality that exceeds utility. 
This is the origin of desire (Bouchet, 2011). But I will not expand on this 
concept here, since – for now – I am heading to the concept of culture. So I 
have to stress that for the human child entering a world of significations, all 
things and actions refer to one another and acquire new definitions and 
utilities in relation to this developing system of significations. Even though 
the human child is programmed to be able to make use of language, what 
this language is going to be and how the representations within this language 
will enable, now depend on the state of development of this new incorporeal 
human world of imagination. 
As the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon expressed it: “The mediation 
between man and the world becomes a world itself, the structure of the 
world” (Simondon, 1989 (1958): 181 author’s translation). And elsewhere in 
this same book on the mode of existence of technical objects Simondon points 
out, with reference to the specificity of operating knowledge, that reality does 
not precede knowledge but comes after it, “because this knowledge only 
grasps reality by reconstructing it by manipulating elements” (Simondon, 
1989 (1958): 235 author’s translation). In this passage Simondon opposes 
operating knowledge to contemplative knowledge. As I see it, however, the 
so-called contemplative knowledge becomes a dream for human beings as 
all experience becomes mediated by – and filled with – the above-mentioned 
specific human signification systems. This of course can trigger a desire for 
contemplation and communion. But again this will have to take the form of 
imagination, art or religion. 
This specificity of the human’s world is not a new idea, and many phi- 
losophers did point to it of course. Friedrich Nietzsche meant that Man was 
“das noch nicht festgestellte Tier” the “not yet determined animal,” that is to 
say “a not yet consummated being” that still has to complete himself, but 
enabled with a remarkable ability to make up for natural defects with skill 
and intelligence (Nietzsche, 1980). Henri Bergson wrote in 1907 in Creative 
Evolution that “in the animal, invention is never anything but a variation on 
the theme of routine.” Even though individuals can show initiative and enlarge 
their habits, they escape automatism only for an instant “for just the time to 
create a new automatism.”11 Whereas with humans, “consciousness breaks 
the chain. In man, and in man alone, it sets itself free” (Bergson, 1998 (1907): 
264). And one page later, Bergson adds: 
 
Our brain, our society, and our language are only the external 
and various signs of one and the same internal superiority. They 
tell, each after its manner, the unique, exceptional success which 
life has won at a given moment of its evolution (1998, (1907): 265 
my emphasis). 
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We now know that it took three million years for the brain of an ape, little by 
little, to turn into a human brain. Still, at one point a decisive stage was 
reached. Jean-Didier Vincent uses the flick-knife metaphor to describe this 
moment in the evolution when humans became able to share experiences. 
Thus it is not only an issue of “consciousness”;12 what was achieved is “inter- 
subjectivity.” Vincent proposes the neologism “representaction” (Vincent, 
2000: 166) to emphasize the link between action and representation related 
to this “intersubjectivity.” The human aptitude for sharing those “represen- 
tactions” with one another turns them into something that no longer belongs 
to one brain, but to a collectivity. This ensemble of “representactions” is 
called “language.” It can be said to be a tool that turns others into instruments 
and nature into score. It provides humans with a very specific tool, a sort of 
shelter, headland/promontory, mirror, and screen – all in one.  
The specific way humans have to relate to their surroundings (thus creat- 
ing their world) is also a specific way to relate to themselves. Humans are 
beings who relate to themselves and cannot avoid doing so. Only humans 
have this ability for self-relation (in German Selbstverhalten, in French 
réflexivité). Reason and imagination involve this self-relatedness, enabling 
us to reflect upon what we are doing and what we might do. We take a step 
back from ourselves and survey the means-end relationship. The French 
philosopher Étienne Bimbenet contends that, regardless of the fact that its 
emergence was contingent and natural, mankind’s specific mode of being in 
the world is a “disanimalization:” an absolute appears as we experience our 
humanity, that of issues of right and dignity which is why “we have to think 
of mankind as both a natural fact and a bearer of absolute values, just like 
mingling of water and fire” (Bimbenet, 2011: 21 author’s translation). The 
German philosopher Rüdiger Safranski points out that “reason” comes into 
play “when we are able to set long-term goals for which the will must first 
be mobilized” (Safranski, 2005: 1). He stresses that this requires us to step 
outside or beyond ourselves: “The career of man as a rational being begins 
with this stepping out, this self-transcendence” (Safranski, 2005: 1). 
 
4. Culture is not just a Tool 
 
Humans seem to be bound to reflect upon this issue of transcendence which 
can be said to be fundamental to human culture (Bouchet, 2007). Still tran- 
scendence can be seen as the result of an immanent evolution process. In 
1988, the French anthropologist and sociologist Georges Balandier referred to 
something that was scattered in other beings and other animal societies but 
that converges in humans (Balandier, 1990: 114). Today rather than conver- 
gence, it would be more appropriate to talk about coevolution: We know 
now that both innate and acquired characteristics played their part in the 
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evolution process that led to the kind of animal we became. All ethological 
studies of social species show that humans have not the exclusivity of 
parental behaviors, incest avoidance, communication rituals, power relations, 
cooperative behaviors. Even though they take a specific form among humans, 
these behaviors are all deeply rooted in our social animal condition. Let me 
give one example: like Kaspar Hauser or Truffaut’s “wild child,” in other 
words like us, the infant of an ape also cannot develop his genetic program if 
removed from his parents. In other words: Like humans, an ape cannot 
become an ape if removed from his culture (Cyrulnik and Morin, 2004: 25). 
Culture and nature did not only coexist but also coevolved. One of our time’s 
most trans-disciplinary thinker, Edgar Morin was right when in 1973 in his 
seminal book The Lost Paradigm: Human Nature, he explained that humans 
are beings of culture thanks to nature as much as a natural being thanks to 
culture (Morin, 1973: 101). We cannot any longer maintain an opposition 
between the role played by what is innate and what is learned. As Morin 
explained: what develops – through the process that led to the human being 
as we now know it – is the innate aptitude to acquire the cultural system that 
makes it possible to integrate what is learned. Moreover, “it is the natural 
ability to develop human culture and the cultural ability to develop human 
nature” (Morin, 1973: 100 author’s translation). Culture can be said to have 
been a potential, and nature to play at first the main role in human behavior 
until, one hundred thousand years ago, what the French paleontologist and 
paleoanthropologist Yves Coppens called the “reverse point” was reached 
(Coppens, 2008: 162). Since then, contrary to other species, Homo sapiens 
have mainly relied on their culture to remain Homo sapiens. If it was not for 
culture, humans would be one of the most helpless primates (Morin, 2003: 
29). 
A few decades ago, it was common to assume that technical intelligence 
preceded and helped developed language. Today after so many scientists 
(aided with new technologies and new collective ideas) studied the evolution 
of tools and skulls, the most convincing explanation is that both developed 
simultaneously. Jean-François Dortier, editor of the French journal Sciences 
Humaines, summarizes what we know about the coevolution of language and 
technique: 
 
 “Recent hypotheses on the origins of language set its appearance 
about two million years ago, at the same epoch as the first tools and 
the first specimens of the type Homo” (Dortier, 2012: 241 author’s 
translation).  
 “There was most certainly a combined development of the two 
functions” (Dortier, 2012: 244 author’s translation).  
 “The concomitant appearance of language and of the first crafted 
tools is in accordance with the hypothesis of a mental ability to 
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produce deferred mental representations that would have been the 
common cause of the rapid development of both language and 
technique” (Dortier, 2012: 245 author’s translation). 
 
Tools, language and social behavior are interdependent entities that evolved 
in relation with each other. Neurobiologist Kathleen R. Gibson points out that 
“no early hominid is likely to have reached modern levels of intelligence in 
any one of these domains without having reached it in all of them” (1995: 264). 
In the Handbook of Human Symbolic Evolution Thomas G. Wynn states 
that tools which originally were used like apes use them today – have seen 
their use been transformed. Wynn observes that “by one million years ago 
tools present patterns well outside the range of anything we know for apes” 
(1996: 263). He stresses that “it is not until relatively late in human evolution, 
certainly by fifteen thousand, that tools present the volatile time and space 
patterns typical of the indexical role of modern tools” (Wynn, 1996: 263). In 
other words, by this time, “like modern tools, these tools carried information 
about the social status of the maker” (Wynn, 1996: 284). 
Thus, tools became more and more elaborate, and tools became more 
than mere tools. Some meaning had to be attached to them. For instance, 
they had to look good in the eyes of those who made them and also in the 
eyes of others; like these beautiful bifaces shaped around a fossil. Coppens, 
as others point out suggest: 
 
[Humankind] becomes conscious of symmetry and achieves it, 
chooses the material to work upon for its technical qualities but 
sometimes also for its aesthetical qualities – brilliance, patina, color 
– builds huts, tents, shelters, walls, controls and maintains fire ... 
divides his dwelling in specialized areas ... invents mattresses and 
blankets (1983: 135 author’s translation). 
 
For Coppens, it is not much of an exaggeration to say that “for the first time 
in the history of life, a non biological life component gradually enters the 
definition of a living being” (Coppens, 1983: 107 author’s translation). This 
lends support to Bimbenet’s above mentioned theory of “disanimalization” 
(Bimbenet 2011), but certainly not to a theory of “disnaturalization.” The 
French archeologist Michel Lorblanchet insists upon the importance of ab- 
straction for tool making and art marking. According to him, the production 
of the first tools, which he considers to be the first artworks, shows that, 
“without any external incentive, without reference to any preexisting model, 
the human intellect produces by itself the abstract schemes that are the source 
of art” (Lorblanchet, 2006: 119 author’s translation).  
Abstraction is a process. Tools are shaped by brains that not only see but 
foresee. It is not only what humans see with their eyes and do with their 
hands; it is also how humans use what they see and what they do to combine 
with the mental images they already have, improve what they do, imagine 
CEEOL copyright 2017
CEEOL copyright 2017
 26 
what they could do. In other words, as the prehistorian Henry de Lumley-
Woodyear states: “It implies the conception of models and the emergence of 
conceptual thinking” (1999: 173 author’s translation). According to him this 
emergence did not occur in one go and is most likely to have existed in em- 
bryonic state in earlier humans or pre-humans. According to today’s scientists, 
the human brain evolved in the course of the hominization process. The 
increased size of the brain or of its component parts resulted in increased 
information processing capacity in those behavioral domains mediated by 
the enlarged regions. Gibson explains: “Just as brain size increased slowly, 
those aspects of language, tool use and social intelligence which depend on 
increased information processing capacity would also have evolved slowly” 
(1995: 263). Thus, the human brain was shaped by both genes and experience 
– like the experience of making tools for example, and it ended up being 
filled with mental images that mattered the most, for individuals, groups and 
the species. Those mental images became collective, accumulated, combined, 
selected in a way never experienced by other animals. In the words of the 
French ethologist and neurologist Boris Cyrulnik: “the human brain is the 
only one among living beings able to totally take information out of context. 
Thus, the only one able to make signs/produce signs, with gestures, sounds, 
clothes, etc.” (Cyrulnik & Morin, 2004: 18 author’s translation). 
Filled with ideas not only in their personal brains but in their culture 
humans transformed what they saw and what they thought. This process 
became materialized in design, and in art. (It is also worth mentioning that 
long before the emergence of elaborated tools “the first human beings had a 
sense of form and color, and were endowed with a certain touch of delicacy” 
(Lorblanchet, 2006: 67 author’s translation). Archeologists remind us that 
the history of culture is not a steady one. There have been long periods 
without innovation and short ones with an overabundance. Nevertheless, again, 
once what Coppens called the “reverse point” was reached, and culture 
became a faster source of innovation than nature, the ability to innovate 
became related to the transmission of traditions and innovations. In the 
above mentioned Handbook of Human Symbolic Evolution the British social 
anthropologist Tim Ingold summarized clearly what makes the difference: 
 
Human beings are distinguished neither by consciousness nor by 
their possession of learning-transmitted tradition. They are distin- 
guished by the extreme elaboration of certain cognitive specialisms 
– above all by the faculty of language – which provide a necessary 
psychological foundation for reflective self-awareness, for society 
as a moral or regulative order, for tool-making and production of 
planned activities, for the construction of symbolically-encoded 
systems of knowledge, and for the transmission of these through 
teaching. In all these respects it may truthfully be said that the 
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world we inhabit is one that, to an ever greater extent, we have 
made for ourselves, and that confronts us as the artificial product 
of human activity (1996: 199).   
Thus, as already stressed, what makes us human is neither culture,13 nor 
language nor labor, nor art, but the degree of complexity those products and 
means of evolution have reached for us as a species. Neither are love, learn- 
ing, power, fantasy, communication, affection, hierarchy, strategy, altruism, 
community, social relations, social norms or social status the defining char- 
acteristics of humanness. All of these are to be experienced by other animal 
species. Among those are insects, birds, and of course, mammals and primates. 
The difference lies in the way humans “make use” of all these. It is also the 
consequence of such a level of complexity. Still, as a result, as the French 
philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis echoing Bergson and Heidegger puts it: 
“Man is the sole living being to break the informational/representational/ 
cognitive closure in and through which every other living being exists” 
(Castoriadis, 1997: 323). 
Because of all this, we have to specify what culture, the symbolic, art and 
labor are in human societies. They are all a product of – and means for – our 
imagination. This is why human creativity and innovation outmatches by far 
that of other animals. Humans have developed the mental ability to represent 
the world in the forms of “ideas” that they can combine, remember and 
reflect upon. It is the ability to operate with deferred representations, with 
this necessity to relate to inner worlds of representation, and this craving to 
make sense of all kind of relations that characterizes humankind. 
 
5. The Phylogenetic Antiquity of Aesthetic Behavior 
 
This is precisely what the French philosopher Georges Bataille was pointing 
out in the 1950s when, commenting on the beautiful paintings in the caves of 
Lascaux in France, he related art to the sacred (Bataille, 1955). Still, forty 
years after he wrote his comments, another cave, that of Chauvet, was 
discovered a few hundred miles away (Clottes, 2010). It is twice as old, that 
is to say thirty five thousand years old, and covered with similarly beautiful 
and elaborate paintings.14 Since then many traces of symbolic and artistic 
activities were discovered around the world such as the seventy seven 
thousand year old stones found in the caves of Blombos in South Africa in 
2002. They are not very beautiful but they seem symbolic in many ways 
(Anati, 2003: 69). Thus it is now believed that art and symbolic thinking did 
not originate in one place and in one go. For what we know today, the 
emergence of symbolic thinking has to be placed into a cultural dynamic that 
started much earlier than in the times of Lascaux and must have passed 
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through various stages. Also, it might have taken place in various species. 
The French paleoanthropologist Picq (2005) tells us that forty thousand 
years ago four types of Homo still cohabited the earth. At least three of those 
endowed with consciousness and speech were concerned about what might 
happen to them after death (Picq, 2005: 50). As it seems, most of what – 
until when Bataille wrote his comments – was believed to characterize our 
species turned up to be something we had in common with the other three. 
Our branch of Homo is not the only one to have stolen fire and who knows 
since when, may be long before the domestication of fire, which branch 
started to dance and play with shadows and lights.  
When Bataille was puzzled and filled with wonder in the Lascaux caves 
little research had been done on prehistoric art. “Fifty years ago specialists of 
prehistoric art could be counted on the fingers of two hands and almost all of 
them were from Europe” (Anati, 2003: 63). Also, “three quarters of the known 
forty five million rock paintings was discovered during those last fifty years” 
(Anati, 2003: 18). We cannot any longer ignore that artistic creativity was 
expressed outside Europe for at least as long a time as in Europe and we 
must be aware that European prehistoric art cannot be explained independently 
of what we know from prehistoric art from other continents (Anati, 2003: 56).  
Today archeologists claim that “Man has been an artist from the outset” 
(Lorblanchet, 2002: 8). Prehistorians became conscious of the phylogenetic 
antiquity of aesthetical and symbolical behaviors (Lorblanchet, 2002: 159). 
They state that an “innate taste for beauty” has been present in the species 
we descend from as well as in our cousin species (Lorblanchet, 2002: 160). 
They stress that there was an evolution, that “curiosity, taking a fancy to 
adorn one’s body precede and foreshadow art proper”(Coppens, 1990: 102), 
and that domestic art contained the seeds of the greatest rock paintings 
(Lorblanchet, 2006: 161). They point out that some kind of aesthetic sense 
can be traced two million years back when the first types of Homo as just 
mentioned were gathering stones the forms or colors of which they fancied 
(Lorblanchet, 2002: 8). The gathering, transport and use of exogenous hard 
to hew rocks from faraway origins clearly shows that all along in prehistoric 
times “non utilitarian and non functional requirements, purely aesthetical 
concerns related to beliefs, often had the priority over comfort and efficiency” 
(Lorblanchet, 2002: 84). Thus, an interest in the aesthetic dimension of tool 
making has been traced to before the time of Chauvet, in various branches of 
the Homo species. Adding to this, one should not ignore that many objects 
and performances that we would consider to be artistic did not stand the test 
of time (Anati, 2003: 18). Still, this aesthetic sense co-evolved with other 
intellectual and social characteristics among the different types of Homo.15 
Human intellectual abilities developed in a combining manner for many 
years before reaching such a level of complexity that forty thousand years 
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ago made possible this “artistic and symbolic explosion” (Lorblanchet, 2002: 
9) to which the paintings in Chauvet and Lascaux are a testimony.16  
The specialists believe that visual art – which is constituted of represen- 
tative figures (pictograms) and of conceptual signs (ideograms) that are 
willingly combined in associations – can only be traced fifty thousand years 
back (Anati, 2003: 74). The generalization and multiplication of symbolic 
expressions first happened around the world between fifty and forty thousand 
years ago (Lorblanchet, 2006: 78).17 As such, “there is no ‘cradle of art’” 
(Lorblanchet, 2006: 31; 164). Nevertheless, “an artistic and symbolic explosion” 
did take place at that time when cave paintings emerged, thus “expressing 
the emergence of new spirituality” (Lorblanchet, 2002: 9). In Bataille’s view 
though, it was a radical change. He thought that “never before Lascaux did 
we reach the reflection of this inner life of which art – and art alone – 
assumes the communication” (Bataille, 1980 (1955): 12). He was right, but it 
occurred fifteen thousand years earlier than Lascaux, in the caves of Chauvet 
and in many other places, and there was no evolution between the times of 
Chauvet and Lascaux (Lorblanchet, 1999: 107).  Referring to a “cradle of 
humanity” or “birth of art” is thus inappropriate. Both caves are the outcome 
of a more than two million year evolution process in the materialization of 
mental images.18 Their outbreak therefore should not be compared to a big 
bang, but rather seen as a “qualitative jump” (Lorblanchet, 2006: 155; 164). 
As Lorblanchet stresses such outbreaks appeared in different forms in much 
distant places and times. As Coppens (2008: 201) explains these different 
outbreaks occurred for specific populations in specific places on earth at 
specific times, and there is no immediate and direct correspondence between 
the “birth” of art and the “birth” of modern humankind (Lorblanchet, 2006: 
31). “Man is an artist by nature and the history of art begins and is one with 
that of mankind” (Lorblanchet, 2006: 168). The evolution of art followed 
extremely different paths in different regions of the world (Lorblanchet, 2006: 
31). The Italian archeologist Emmanuel Anati points out that “prehistoric 
artworks were produced during a time period that lasted for at least twenty 
times longer than our own [Christian] era” (Anati, 2003: 18). During that 
long period of time they were often retouched and served different functions 
(Lorblanchet, 1999: 109). The themes, styles and techniques of the oldest 
motives differ radically from each other. Even sophistication levels differ 
(Lorblanchet, 2006: 34). Nevertheless, according to Coppens “in Europe, the 
painted caves are indisputably sanctuaries” (Coppens, 2008: 201 author’s 
translation). Adding to this, Anati points out that all the paintings and en- 
gravings recently rediscovered in remote hidden places on the five continents 
“are like sacred historical texts in which are stored the mysteries of the 
origin of the intellect” (Anati, 2003: 389 author’s translation). Such points of 
view are close to that of Bataille’s. Even closer is the following statement by 
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Anati: “As a matter of fact many of those works serve the dialog with the 
forces regulating natural phenomena conditioning/determining human exis- 
tence” (Anati, 2003: 392 author’s translation).  
Thus, even though it is the result of a long co-evolutionary process, the 
“birth of art” as analyzed by Bataille can – as I see it – still be considered as 
epochal. The human race had then reached a level of complexity where cog- 
nitive and analytical competences allowed humans to communicate intentions 
and to program actions. It is now common to assume that “everywhere the 
brain mechanism at the origin of artistic creativity had the same common 
denominator” (Anati, 2003: 318–19 author’s translation). Today, being able 
to produce artworks, to use a complex articulated language and to have 
thoughts entailing abstraction and conceptualization, is regarded as the essen- 
tial characteristic of humankind. Those abstraction, conceptualization and 
aesthetical abilities were used in a specific way though. Bataille stressed the 
importance of a mythical dimension in the essence of humankind. It is also 
very important to stress what is absent in Bataille’s approach to the essence 
of humankind. Bataille does not relate to humankind’s essence as an issue of 
specificity or hierarchy. Bataille’s purpose is neither to maintain a distance 
from the other animals nor to establish the superiority of humankind in the 
light of God, but to clarify humankind’s main problem and potential. Bataille 
does not link humankind’s specificity to necessity, utility or technique. Neither 
does he place the human being on the very top of a ladder from where to 
haughtily contemplate and dominate the rest of the world. Bataille just points 
out that humankind fundamentally has to deal and play with the representa- 
tions they now mentally and culturally have of the world around them.19 A 
three thousand year old anthropocentric tradition has been claiming that 
what makes sense is that humans are not an animal but an elected creature, 
God’s favorite, the only biped20 and sole tool producing creature that – 
thanks to their tools – can and may master the world. Cyrulnik, Morin, Picq 
and many others stress that we are witnessing the extinction of this pervad- 
ing western ontological opposition between animal and human. Humankind 
is no longer presented as a supernatural being by nature. There is no longer a 
clear divide between animal and human. Today humankind is being re- 
introduced within nature. Humans are no longer against nature nor are they 
supernatural.21 Nevertheless humans are an outstanding animal as they do 
keep specific human space (Cyrulnik and Morin, 2004: 17–18). A place – the 
human world – where the imaginary cannot be avoided and imagination must 
be used. This is why Castoriadis called it radical imagination: 
 
I believe the radical imagination is what distinguishes the human 
psychism from the animal psychism. What makes the psyche ca- 
pable of producing those representations, those phantasms, which 
are not the outcome of perceptions? It is the radical imagination. 
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That would be a first approach. The human psyche is characterized 
by the autonomy of the imagination, by a radical imagination: It is 
not simply a matter of seeing – or seeing oneself – in a mirror, but 
also of the ability to formulate what is not there, to perceive, in 
just anything, what is not there. For the human psychism there is a 
flux, a representational spontaneity that is not subordinated to a 
predetermined end (2007 (1999): 203). 
 
Castoriadis clearly states that this radical imagination not only makes the 
difference but also is a collective creation: “It is the radical imagination that 
presents an outside world formed in this way and not otherwise” (2005, 
(1992): 249–50). 
 
6. Aesthetics are more than Technique 
 
At the time when Bataille was writing his essays the prevailing ideologies 
had a common premise that there was an inherent logic in the development 
of the tool: humans had been liberating themselves – and will continue to do 
so – thanks to technique. These ideologies proposed a common optimistic 
vision for the future of humankind in which production and consumption as 
a binomial played the main role and nature none (Bouchet, 1994). Nature was 
just an external means for the tool. Art and play made sense when serving 
economic development. Those ideologies were not only political, they were 
also scientific. Among others, the French philosopher, Georges Gusdorf stressed 
that “science is incapable of providing by its own means its origin and goals. 
It always has to rely on an eschatology” (Gusdorf, 1984 (1953): 326 author’s 
translation). Science is not autonomous: it always must originally receive 
and keep on borrowing its principles from a decree of human will (Gusdorf, 
1984 (1953): 325). These ideologies were to be traced in all branches of 
scientific activities, more than often as helpful apriori for scientific research, 
and of course in all branches of human sciences. At a time when it was not 
yet evident that human beings are not just tool-producing animals who 
inherited the earth and cannot be distinguished by consciousness or by their 
possession of learning-transmitted tradition, Bataille went beyond the varnish 
of animality and technique to find the sacred. 
Indeed, another related essential characteristic of humankind is the relation- 
ship to death expressed in the sacred that Bataille pointed out. Bataille was 
right, the perception of death seals the gap between the human mind and the 
biological world because, as Morin says, “it is in relation to death that mind, 
consciousness, rationality and myth meet, collide, unite” (2003: 39 author’s 
translation). And here again Anati’s observations echo those of Bataille on 
eros and thanatos original human concerns: “starting from the time man 
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developed his complex abilities of abstraction synthesis and association, his 
two main concerns were life and death” (Anati, 2002: 553 author’s translation). 
However, complex abilities of abstraction synthesis and association do 
not have to lead to rational thinking alone. Creativity and imagination feed 
rational and irrational thinking alike, and those support each other. Anati 
puts it this way: “One can guess that art emerges as one of the components 
of a ‘package’ of expression and communication faculties acquired by man 
thanks to new kinds of associative and speculative cerebral capacities” 
(Anati, 2003: 75 author’s translation). 
Art is thus essential to humankind. It can be compared to what some 
theologians refer to as the “original sin.” This fact should be kept in mind 
and not overshadowed by an interest in the historical variations of expressions 
of art than in the essential creativity of art. As Anati stresses: “The logic of 
art is also the logic behind language and later writings. It originates in the 
fundamental mechanism of the system of associations by making use of terms 
that originally were universal before vernacular factors gradually played their 
part” (Anati, 2003: 321 author’s translation). 
Art is fundamentally about shaping visions and very closely related to 
this specific human ability to make projects. Visions and projects will of 
course vary over time, especially now that the visions themselves are part of 
what humans have to relate to. In times of great change it can be hard to 
maintain visions or shape new ones. Such trying times are times of crisis when 
it becomes much harder for a group of humans to interpret and represent what 
they are experiencing, especially in relation to their future. 
Following Morin I use the term of crisis to refer to situations when 
uncertainty enters and prevail in domains where some sort of predictability 
seems to be secured. We have to remember that humans make plans and do 
so on the basis of their perception and representation of some kind of 
regularity. Which is why what seems out of control is not only the external 
natural forces humans have to deal with, but it is also the inner appreciation 
they have of those forces. As a matter of fact in times of crises, the loss of 
control also affects representations, which no longer seem to make sense with 
such certainty. Decisions concerning appreciation, action and representation 
have to be taken, which is why Morin stresses that “the moments of indeter- 
mination and decision are concomitant inasmuch as decision and uncertainty 
rely on each other” (1984 (1976): 140 author’s translation). Indeed, the crisis 
is a decisive moment of indecision. 
 
7. The Indomitability of the Aesthetics 
 
Art can be said to be even more essential then. Is it not bound to be in such 
times when representations and creativity are challenged the most? Again, as 
CEEOL copyright 2017
CEEOL copyright 2017
 33 
Bataille pointed out, art essentially has to do with core representations and 
creativity, with, as earlier mentioned, what Castoriadis (1997: 343) calls “the 
giving-of-form to the Chaos” once Chaos is perceived as such. Art is neither 
just a product nor design or technique. Art is much more central and relates 
to this ability to project oneself in time, the ability that Heidegger thought to 
be the essential characteristic of humankind. For Heidegger, Zeyn=Abgrund, 
in other words Being as such (translated into English as “Be-ing” or “Beying”) 
equals Abyss (Heidegger, 2003 (1989): V; Heidegger, 2012 (1989): V). 
Heidegger also related meaning to the Abyss when pointing out that “the 
meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the 
‘ground’ which gives entities support; for a ‘ground’ becomes accessible only 
as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness” (Heidegger, 1977 
(1920): 152; Heidegger, 2007 (1920): 194). Heidegger’s conception seems to 
me to be pretty close to that of Castoriadis when he writes: “Meaning is the 
‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intel- 
ligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and 
a fore-conception” (Heidegger, 1977 (1920): 151; Heidegger, 2007 (1920): 
193). The French sociologist Duvignaud expressed it this way: “In order to 
exist, Being must represent itself, put its existence into play in order to 
become a concrete reality” (Duvignaud, 1966: 81 author’s translation). 
It is thus essential to humankind as individuals and groups to represent 
the world and themselves in it. A crisis is when the old sources of meaning 
are worn out or – more precisely – hardly can make sense in a new context, 
and new ones are almost impossible to identify and exploit. Not that the old 
sources run dry, it is more that they become silted or end up in a void. As I 
see it, the whole point of Bataille was to stress the how fundamental role – 
once the sacred and desire have emerged – art plays in creating new repre- 
sentations of what matters the most in terms of representation and meaning 
(Bouchet, 2011; Bouchet, 2014).  
This does not entail that a determinist logic is then established. Nor that 
art has from now on to “reflect” changes. As I earlier alluded to without 
giving it a name, culture can evolve in manifold forms once this imaginary 
system of representations has overlapped and added to reality (or to put it 
another way, once it has become an inevitable part of reality and – in a 
recursive manner – of its interpretation). 
Castoriadis tells us that “this giving-of-form to the Chaos (to the Chaos of 
what is and that within man himself) ... is, perhaps, the best definition of 
culture” (1997: 343). Castoriadis also stresses that this profound and in- 
novative kind of form-giving “manifests itself with striking clarity in the 
case of art” (1997: 343). Creativity persists even when it seems asleep, and it 
is a common understanding of all the main authors I refer to in this article, 
that creativity is characterized by unpredictability and indomitability.  
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Understood as such, artistic creativity is irreducible to an all-encompassing 
determinism and, therefore, cannot be said to “reflect” a society that it con- 
tributes to change. Even if we refer to what fills the art museums, to assume 
that artworks in history only reflect social change would be a reductionism, a 
contradiction even. Creativity and the social imaginary play an active part in 
social change. Art is a construct.  
This radical and irreducible character of creativity applies to each in- 
dividual artist as well as to art in general. Here is what the great French 
historian and sociologist Pierre Francastel22 wrote about in the introduction 
to his seminal work Art and Technology: “Art is a construct, a power to give 
order and to prefigure. The artist does not translate; he invents. We are in the 
realm of imagined realities” (Francastel, 2003 (1956): 19 my emphasis). 
 
8. Homo Aestheticus 
 
Humans are more than tool making animals and even their rational actions 
feed on radical imagination. Attention should be given to the conditions 
given to radical creativity. There are more fundamental issues than those of 
economic policies and efficient techniques, and the answers given to those 
are precisely what is challenged the most in times of crises. There is a part of 
human creativity that is not dedicated to instrumentality. Is not this why we 
differentiate between art and technique, between poiesis and techne? Human 
creativity can be used in different ways. 
In the words of the paleoanthropologist Pascal Picq, the human race/species 
essentially is also: “a species that cannot live without attributing meaning to 
its life, an ontology, in a cosmos devoid of meaning” (Picq, 2005: 50 author’s 
translation). Human beings invest the world, make sense of it thanks to their 
imagination, if with that word we summarize the above mentioned complex 
set of intensified abilities. They have to make sense and to accept that the 
way they ended up doing it can be challenged at any time, and this is even 
more so within modern societies that value questions higher than answers 
(Bouchet, 1994; Bouchet, 2007). 
 
NOTES 
 
1.Bataille, Georges (2005/1959), The Cradle of Humanity. Prehistoric Art and 
Culture. Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 89. 
2. Art has to be distinguished from craft and technique even though the Greeks 
only had one term to refer to art and skill, tekné. 
3. Animals other than humans are intelligent. They are not only acting upon 
innate behavior mechanisms, they do learn, solve problems, explore and discover. 
Some of them like chimpanzees share many a social trait with humans. However 
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nothing indicates that chimpanzees can turn those representations into systems of 
significations.  
4. Within Christianity language was long conceived as a gift from god to man 
thus making it very difficult to even ask how language and art came into being 
(Hombert and Lenclud, 2014: 56). Their outstanding book came out after I had 
written this paper. This note written just before publication ensures it is listed in the 
bibliography. 
5. We now have to reconsider how to make sense of our capabilities. This new 
awareness of how much we have in common with other animals, of how much we 
owe our biological components and our natural ground roots opens new reflections, 
new images, new forms of dialogue and understanding. The psycho-physiologist 
Philippe Ropartz stresses how important it is that the old animality-humanity 
dichotomy be replaced by the idea of a continuity animal man (Ropartz, 1989). In 
my opinion, this bodes for a reorganization of the social imaginary. I will of course 
come back to it in a longer text. 
6. Pinker points out that “Nonhuman communication systems are based on one 
of the three designs: a finite repertory of calls (one for warnings of predators, one for 
claims to territory, and so on), a continuous analog signal that registers the mag- 
nitude of some state (the livelier the dance of the bee, the richer the food source that 
it is telling its hivemates about), or a series of random variations on a theme (a 
birdsong repeated with a new twist each time)” (Pinker, 1994: 334). 
7. To say that animals communicate in an imperative mode means that animals 
always refer to things or actions to say “I want this to happen.” Humans can refer to 
communication as such (Vauclair, 1999: 157; Vincent, 2000: 179). 
8. Left alone, the child will not learn and if the infant does not make use of this 
genetically given potential early enough, it will take a much greater effort to learn 
any language. 
9. Ferry considers freedom to be the differentiating criteria. He defines it as a 
capacity to distance oneself from nature transcending the bare necessities to take a 
moral stand (Ferry and Vincent, 2000: 100). 
10. Pinker notes that, “Even the seat of human language in the brain is special. 
The vocal calls of primates are controlled not by their cerebral cortex but by phylo- 
genetically older neutral structures in the brain stem and limbic system structures 
that are heavily involved in emotion. Human vocalizations other than language, like 
sobbing, laughing, moaning, and shouting in pain, are also controlled subcortically. 
Subcortical structures even control the swearing that follows the arrival of a hammer 
on a thumb, that emerges as an involuntary tic in Tourette’s syndrome, and that can 
survive as Broca’s aphasics’ only speech. Genuine language, as we saw in the 
preceding chapter, is seated in the cerebral cortex, primarily the left perisylvian 
region” (Pinker, 1994: 334). 
11. In Japan it has been observed that the knowledge acquired by a single ape 
was communicated to the next generation. The ape lost some kind of potato in salty 
water and picked it up again. As it liked the new taste, it went on dipping other 
potatoes in the salty water. Other members of the community copied the procedure.  
12. Consciousness is the ability to conceive of objects and integrate them in some 
sort of unity: be it materially given objects or ideal ones such as images for example. 
CEEOL copyright 2017
CEEOL copyright 2017
 36 
We know now that most mammals and birds do have some kind of consciousness. 
However, being conscious of an object is not the same as being able to assign a 
meaning to it. Only then does the object acquire a signification. For a signification to 
be given to an object, this object has to be related to a whole interactive system of 
significations maintained by interactions that cannot exist in one consciousness alone. 
This inability that nonhumans have to combine the ideas of others in their own 
personal mind has been stressed. Johann-Gottfried Herder criticized Jean-Baptiste 
Rousseau’s individualistic view of culture. In his Outline of a Philosophy of the 
History of Man from 1784 he defends the idea that social relations were crucial to 
the history of humankind, that it is “speech” alone that has rendered humans human 
and pointed out that the ideas apes might have cannot be combined in their 
individual brain with the ideas of others. 
13. Of course it is always a question of degree of complexity. Nevertheless, the 
understanding of cultural phenomena has to build upon the observation of other 
animal cultures and this at least “since we know that chimpanzees share so many 
social, cognitive and cultural abilities with us” (Picq, 2005: 115). Picq even qualifies 
chimpanzees’ social relations as “machiavellical” (2005: 107 author’s translation). 
The French ethologist Dominique Lestel concludes that “we have to accept the idea 
that there is a plurality of culture, not in quantitative terms ... but by nature” or in 
other words in qualitative terms (2009: 330 author’s translation). That is to say there 
are different kinds of intelligence, different kinds of perceptions relative to different 
kinds of animals, there are different kinds of cultures with different characteristics. 
Specialists in ethology, ecology and animal cognition have identified a limited 
number of organizational principles in the range of animal societies (See: Cézilly, 
2006: 175). They stress that we cannot just keep imposing the conceptual models 
emerging from the observations of our human societies on all types of societies. This 
calls into question humankind’s understanding of itself. Again, as stated earlier, if it 
was not for culture Homo sapiens would be one of the most helpless primates (See: 
Morin, 2003: 29 or Morin 2008: 1899). 
14. The Chauvet-Pont-d’Arc Cave was granted UNESCO’s World Heritage 
status in 2014. It is located in southern France near the beautiful Ardèche Canyon in 
a limestone cliff above the former bed of the river. An impressive full-size facsimile 
has been constructed above ground. In it, visitors can experience the same sensations 
of silence, acoustics, temperature, obscurity and humidity as in the original cave. It 
is ten times bigger than the Lascaux Cave facsimile. http://en.cavernedupontdarc.fr 
15. Lorblanchet also points out that “it is impossible to exclude the symbolic 
dimension of the most simple actions from everyday life” (Lorblanchet, 2006: 83). 
16. It is now common to assume that artistic activities must have appeared much 
earlier than when humans were able to produce such elaborated paintings in the 
caves. Over the many years between the first evidence of aesthetic sense and the 
outburst of art discovered in the caves artistic abilities developed in various ways 
among different environments in different groups of Homo. In an article Sally 
McBrearty and Alison S. Brooks articulated a systematic classification based upon 
their readings of several hundreds of researchers work. They state that “modern 
human adaptation appeared gradually [and that] the process can be broken into its 
constituent parts, each having its own origin and demanding its own explanation” 
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(McBrearty & Brooks, 2000: 534). Still, even though it is important to look into the 
different constituent parts, I shall stress that today’s specialists refer to those proc- 
esses as being co-evolutionary. McBrearty and Brooks trace this “gradual assembling 
of the package of modern human behaviors in Africa” (2000: 453). The development 
of an aesthetic sense does play a part in their presentation of the last three stages of 
this evolution process: About three hundred thousand years ago as new kinds of 
tools were made coloring agents such as ochre were first used. Two hundred thou- 
sand years later, one hundred thousand years ago, the new kinds of Homo, the Homo 
sapiens, started using pearls and necklaces. And, it is only fifty thousand years ago 
that Homo sapiens made the first rock and cave paintings.  
17. Lorblanchet refers to “trigging social mechanisms” which were still absent in 
Europe forty six thousand years ago, which were already present in Australia. This, 
according to Lorblanchet, explains why Australians already painted figurative motifs 
on rocks at that time. 
18. In her careful studies of the paintings in the Grotte of Chauvet, the prehistorian 
Valérie Feruglio traces an evolution of techniques as well as radical innovations, 
some of them clearly motivated by the structure of the material painted upon. She 
concludes saying that “the art in Chauvet cannot have been created out of nothing” 
(Féruglio, 2006: 219 author’s translation).  
19. And to do that technique and economy is not enough. Morin insists: “The 
creation of an imaginary world and the fabulous surge of myths, beliefs and religions 
are for mankind as important as technique. Up to now all through history technical 
and rational developments did not succeed in ruling them out” (Morin 2003: 35; 
Morin, 2008: 1907–08 author’s translation). 
20. Pascal Picq criticizes the over importance given to bipedy to differentiate 
humans from other animals. 
21. Morin says that we are “hyper and super living beings.” We have further 
developed abilities from all former stages of our evolution, for instance, that of 
being a mammalian. Every one of us has to spend so many months with our parents 
to learn to do and experience love (Morin 1980: 421–23; Morin 2008: 1096–98). 
Picq stresses that like humans chimpanzees do spend a long time in childhood and 
apprenticeship that favors a considerable adaptative flexibility. For humans the 
amount of information accumulated is larger and the organization of all cultural 
institutions much more complex (Picq, 2005: 113). 
22. Francastel also claimed that “as long as art is considered a reflection of a real 
but eternal world or as a generator of illusions, it will be impossible to reconcile 
practical activities with contemporary art” (Francastel, 2003: 324). ‘’ 
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